The Russian-Ukrainian war can be called the "advanced test ground" of ground warfare and modern weapons, in just over two years, the traditional concept of war has been overturned, and all kinds of new methods of war have also emerged.
In particular, drones, under the pressure of strong technological competition, even some so-called "new methods of warfare" are quickly outdated. Especially in the last two months, the Russian military's drone attack method has once again appeared a refreshing change.
In our mind, the FPV (first Person View) drone almost became the dominant battlefield in Ukraine, this originally small and cheap civilian toy, now almost become the nightmare of tanks and infantry on both sides. In fact, FPV drones have not been tapped for military value in the first year after the outbreak of war in 2022. It was not until last year that FPV drones rose to prominence and quickly replaced the battlefield role of anti-tank missiles, making the latter nearly obsolete.
However, the light of FPV drones has just opened for a year, but it seems to have become the object of elimination, or is "changing its face", into something else. Ordinary FPV UAVs basically rely on wireless data links or mobile communication networks, but the FPV UAVs recently used by the Russian military increasingly use fiber optics, often pulling up a "tail" of several kilometers.
From the appearance point of view, the fiber optic FPV UAV is not much different from the ordinary four-axis FPV UAV, but it has a "wire abductor". The wire abductor is not big, but it can pull out several kilometers of communication fiber. This wired communication mode means that fiber optic drones are not afraid of electronic signal interference, and even can resist some anti-drone jamming guns to some extent.
Of course, the wired mode also limits the working distance of fiber optic drones, and a few kilometers is the maximum limit. However, most FPV drones only have a range of a few kilometers. Therefore, the advantages brought by FPV drones after switching to optical fiber are extremely obvious.
The most direct effect is that the Ukrainian front-line troops have frequently complained in the recent past that it is impossible to "shoot down" fiber optic drones with signal jamming means, resulting in a straight line improvement in the Russian military's UAV combat efficiency. The Russian army's fiber optic UAV not only brazenly carries out high-altitude reconnaissance, is not afraid of the Ukrainian army's countermeasures, but also can carry out attack tasks.
On the other hand, the FPV UAVs of the Ukrainian army have not been able to carry out technical updates in time, and most UAVs still use wireless mode. It should be known that after more than a year of actual combat, the means of suppressing and destroying ordinary FPV drones on both sides have become more and more skilled, and the Russian military fiber FPV drones that are difficult to suppress have quickly achieved an "asymmetric advantage." Not only that, the Russian army also adjusted the ground combat method.
The Ukrainian military said a series of recent ground operations by the Russian military often picked days with bad weather to approach Ukrainian positions in small groups. Rain, clouds and fog have reduced the wireless communication efficiency and the "first view flight" capability of the Ukrainian FPV UAV. On the contrary, the Russian army's fiber optic UAVs, although also affected, can often overcome some adverse weather factors. Coupled with the fact that the Russian army's signal jamming capability remains highly efficient, the Ukrainian army's FPV drones are often unilaterally "blinded".
From these new changes on the battlefield in Ukraine, we can see the astonishing speed at which drones are being updated in the law of warfare. Although our army is also tracking the tactical changes in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and has made a series of follow-up adjustments in equipment and methods of warfare, some of the "new technologies" and "new methods of warfare" we observed a year ago may be obsolete this year because the battlefield is changing so fast.
Not long ago, many incidents of fiber optic drone harassment occurred in Tianjin and other areas, which sounded the alarm to us. The technical challenges expressed by these harassment incidents are actually something that has just emerged on the battlefield of Russia and Ukraine. A boat sailing against the current will fall back if it does not advance.
